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Justice and the Politics of Climate Change 
Derek Bell 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In 2007 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reported that the evidence 
for ‘warming of the climate system is now unequivocal’ and that its causes were ‘very likely’ 
(with a probability of more than 90 percent) due to human action which had increased 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. If ‘business as usual’ continued further, warming of 
between 1.7 and 6.4 degrees would be ‘likely’ by the end of the century with significant 
impacts on ecosystems and on the health, welfare and indeed survival of millions of humans. 
(IPCC 2007:27, 30, 39, 45, 48. For a fuller description of the IPCC findings see Chapter 1 in 
this volume by Barry Pittock).  
In short, human emissions of greenhouse gases will cause (and have already caused
i
) 
harm to other humans. It is a standard commitment of liberal democratic societies that it is 
immoral and unjust for one person to harm another person. Therefore, global climate change 
should be understood as a moral problem or a problem of justice. In the first section of this 
paper, I will defend this claim. In particular, I will argue that conventional economic 
approaches to climate change are inappropriate because they do not take justice seriously. If 
climate change is a problem of justice, we will only be able to solve the problem by 
developing and implementing principles of ‘climate justice’.  
 In the second section of the paper, I consider the role of principles of climate justice 
in the main international agreement on climate change. I identify the principle of ‘common 
but differentiated responsibilities’ (CBDR) as the key principle for allocating climate-related 
duties in international climate politics. In section three, I draw on the recent discussions of 
climate justice in political philosophy to examine the two main principles that are constitutive 
of the ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ (CBDR) principle – namely, the historic 
emitter pays principle and the ability to pay principle.  
 In section four, I consider three different ways that these two principles might be 
combined and I argue that only one of these – proposed by Simon Caney – is plausible. In 
section five, I critically consider Caney’s hybrid principle for allocating climate duties and 
defend an alternative hybrid principle. The proposed principle might be understood as a 
critical interpretation of the ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ (CBDR) principle. 
Finally, I re-state the proposed principle and identify further work that needs to be done to 
develop a fuller conception of climate justice that can be operationalized.  
 
 
Economics or justice?  
 
The dominant approach to assessing how we should respond to climate change in the policy 
arena is cost-benefit analysis. This reflects the dominance of the discipline of economics in 
policy-making and the centrality of cost benefit analysis in economics. (But see also chapter 
by Lawn in this volume).As Eric Neumayer has suggested in relation to the Stern Review on 
the economics of climate change, ‘It had to do some kind of cost benefit analysis … as 
otherwise it would have lost all credibility among mainstream economists’ (Neumayer 2007: 
299). 
 Both advocates and opponents of urgent climate action have used cost benefit analysis 
to support their positions. Bjorn Lomborg has famously employed it to argue against ‘heroic 
CO2 cuts’ (Lomborg 2001: 306). While the Stern Review has (even more) famously 
employed it to argue for immediate action to tackle climate change (Stern 2007). Cost benefit 
analysis ‘proceeds by comparing the costs (and any benefits) associated with anthropogenic 
climate change with the costs and any benefits of a programme for combating climate 
change’ (Caney 2009a: 1). It is the central feature of an ‘ecological modernization’ – or, more 
generally, an ‘economistic’ – approach to climate change. Ecological modernization 
‘understands environmental pollution as economic inefficiency’ (Oels 2005: 196). So, climate 
change – like other environmental problems – is understood as an economic problem. If so 
the solution is to apply economic methods to the problem to design an effective solution. The 
most important method is cost benefit analysis: 
 
[Ecological] modernization, first and foremost, introduces concepts that make 
issues of environmental degradation calculable. Most notably, ecological 
modernization frames environmental problems combining monetary units with 
discursive elements derived from the natural sciences. This provides a common 
denominator through which costs and benefits of pollution can be taken into 
account (Hajer 1995: 26). 
 
Cost benefit analysis monetizes the costs and benefits of alternative policy responses, 
including business-as-usual, and then aggregates those monetary values to identify an 
economically optimum response.  
 The conception of climate change as an economic problem of inefficiency, requiring 
an economic solution is challenged by the conception of it as an injustice. The economic 
approach – and cost benefit analysis as the central economic method – is grounded in a 
utilitarian ethical theory, which does not recognise the idea of injustice. As Dietz et al. 
recognise: 
 
[Standard welfare economics] looks only at the consequences of actions 
(consequentalism) for the welfare or ‘utility’ of individuals in a community 
(perhaps most accurately described as welfarism), where utility is derived from the 
consumption of goods and services (assuming utility can be measured by the 
strength of everyone’s preferences and these preferences can be described by the 
same utility function) (Dietz et al. 2007: 5). 
 
Critics argue that utilitarianism – and welfare economics – suffers from two major ethical 
flaws. First, it treats all preferences – and, therefore all costs and benefits – alike: 
 
For standard economic analysis everything is a preference: the epicure’s wish for a 
little more seasoning and the starving child’s wish for a little more water, the 
collector’s wish for one more painting and the homeless person’s wish for privacy 
and warmth, all are preferences. Quantitatively, they are different because some are 
backed up by a greater ‘willingness to pay’ than others, but qualitatively a 
preference is a preference (Shue 1993: 55). 
 
This form of economic – or welfarist – reductionism assumes an undiscriminating conception 
of the good as preference-satisfaction (Barry 1995: 159). However, as Henry Shue (and many 
others) have argued: 
 
Some so-called preferences are vital, and some are frivolous. Some are needs, and 
some are mere wants (not needs). The satisfaction of some ‘preferences’ is 
essential for survival, or for human decency, and the satisfaction of others is 
inessential for either survival or decency (Shue 1993: 55). 
 Shue’s point is that it is a moral error to think that the relative importance of needs and wants 
or the vital and the frivolous can be measured in a single metric – namely, the intensity of 
preferences as expressed by how much money we are willing to pay to satisfy them. Needs – 
or what is essential for survival or decency – are not commensurable with ‘mere wants’. The 
‘essence of cost-benefit analysis is to refigure citizens [or, perhaps humans] as consumers’ 
(Barry 1995: 154). The economic conception of humans as nothing other than consumers is 
an immoral distortion of human nature, which makes it possible for us to allow trade-offs 
between needs and wants. 
 The second problem with utilitarianism – and cost benefit analysis – is that it 
‘aggregates the costs and benefits felt by individuals and then selects the policy that 
maximises the good’ (Caney 2009a: 11). As Caney points out ‘It has long been recognized 
that one implication of this kind of aggregative consequentialist approach is that it could call 
for outcomes in which some suffer greatly but their disutility is outweighed by enormous 
benefits to others’ (Caney 2009a: 11). 
Economic reductionism conceives of all costs and benefits in terms of a single metric 
– namely, money. Aggregation requires us to adopt the policy that produces the maximum 
monetary value. It ignores ‘the distinction between persons’, thereby ‘conflating all persons 
into one’ (Rawls 1999: 24). Together, these two features of cost benefit analysis allow the 
(frivolous) wants of a large number of people to be weighed against – and even to outweigh – 
the (vital) needs of others. In the context of climate change, the wants of the already affluent 
for luxuries that require high greenhouse gas emissions are weighed against the needs of 
others for food, water, protection from disease and protection from extreme weather events.  
 The outcome of climate change cost benefit analysis is contested by Stern, Lomborg 
and others. However, the whole approach is morally flawed. It is unjust even to consider 
causing one person to be deprived of those things that are essential for survival or human 
decency for the sake of providing luxuries (or even necessities) to any number of others. In 
other words, justice requires that we reject the economic approach to climate change and 
adopt a justice or rights-based approach. The justice approach demands that each individual’s 
‘fundamental interests’ are not sacrificed for the sake of the interests (either fundamental or 
trivial) of others (Caney 2006a: 259). 
 In summary, I have argued that climate change should be understood as a problem of 
justice rather than (merely) a problem of economics. It is a problem of justice because the 
emission of greenhouse gases threatens fundamental human interests, which (contra cost 
benefit analysis) should not be treated as just one cost among many to be traded off in a 
utilitarian calculation. Instead, we should treat those fundamental interests as providing a 
‘side-constraint’ that must be respected in our policies and our actions (Nozick 1974: 29). 
 
 
Climate justice in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.  
 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change does conceptualise climate 
change as a problem of justice. Its ‘ultimate objective’ is to ‘prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system’ (UN 1992: 4). It suggests that such interference should 
be prohibited, not that we should weigh the (monetized) costs and benefits of different 
greenhouse gas emission policies, and adopt the policy that maximises net benefits. Rather 
we are required to adopt a policy that respects the prohibition on such interference.  
The treaty also suggests that ‘anthropogenic interference with the climate system’ 
should be understood as ‘dangerous’ if ecosystems are unable to ‘adapt naturally to climate 
change’, food production is ‘threatened’ or if it prevents ‘economic development … 
[proceeding] in a sustainable manner’ (UN 1992: 4). This might plausibly be interpreted as 
suggesting that humans have fundamental interests in: living in resilient ecosystems; having 
sufficient food to prevent malnutrition; and in sustainable economic development. In other 
words, these interests should be regarded as rights. 
 A theory of justice has two elements – namely, an account of rights and an account of 
the correlative duties. For example, if there is a right to live in resilient ecosystems, there 
must also be a correlative duty not to cause the resilience of ecosystems to be exceeded (e.g., 
by emitting greenhouse gases that cause climate change). More generally, we might 
understand the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change as suggesting that 
there is a duty to ‘protect the climate system’ (UN 1992: 4). However, this raises the 
interesting problem of how that duty should be divided among different duty-bearers. Or, to 
put it another way, who should pay the costs of protecting the climate system and preventing 
dangerous climate change? The framework convention also offers an answer. ‘The Parties 
should protect the climate system … on the basis of equity and in accordance with their 
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’ (UN 1992: 4). 
This has become known as the principle of ‘common but differentiated 
responsibilities’. It has three key elements. First, ‘it establishes unequivocally the common 
responsibility of States to protect the global environment’ (Rajamani 2000: 121). Dangerous 
climate change is a global problem – with global causes and effects – that can only be 
prevented through global co-operation. Therefore, no state can be exempt from the duty to 
co-operate with a global climate regime.  
 Second, ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ requires states to pay ‘in 
accordance with their differentiated responsibilities’. Those states that have contributed more 
to the problem of climate change – through higher historic greenhouse gas emissions – should 
pay more towards the costs of protecting the climate system. They have caused the problem 
(i.e., the increased risk of dangerous climate change), therefore, they should solve the 
problem. We might call this the historic emitter pays principle.  
 Third, ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ requires states to pay ‘in 
accordance with … their respective capabilities’. Those wealthier states that are most able to 
bear the costs should pay more. We might call this the ability to pay principle. ‘Common but 
differentiated responsibilities’ is a pluralistic or ‘hybrid’ principle, which suggests that all 
states bear a common responsibility for protecting climate-related rights but that how much 
each state should pay depends on both their historic emissions and their ability to pay.
ii
 
 In summary, I have suggested that the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change adopts a conception of climate change as a problem of justice and endorses 
three human rights and a hybrid principle for allocating climate duties. In the remainder of 
this paper, I will offer a more detailed critical interpretation and assessment of the 
convention’s principle for allocating climate duties – the principle of ‘common but 
differentiated responsibilities’. I focus on duties rather than on rights for two reasons.iii First, 
it is the debate about the allocation of duties that has received most attention in the growing 
political philosophy literature on climate justice. Second, it is the debate about the allocation 
of duties that is the focus of international negotiations on climate change. 
 
The historic emitter pays principle and the ability to pay principle. 
 
We might usefully begin our discussion of the ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ 
principle by examining each of its constituent principles for allocating climate duties – the 
historic emitter pays principle and the ability to pay principle – in more detail. As Caney 
notes, the historic emitter pays principle has ‘considerable intuitive appeal’: 
 
In everyday situations we frequently think that if someone has produced a harm 
(they have spilled rubbish on the streets, say) then they should rectify that situation. 
They as the causers are responsible for the ill-effects (Caney 2005: 752). 
 
Moreover, the historic emitter pays principle ‘follows from the principle, articulated by 
Rawls and others, that persons should take responsibility for their actions and their ends’ 
(Caney 2009b, 13). The historical emitter pays principle follows from the key liberal 
commitment that freedom comes with responsibility – agents should be held to account for 
their own choices. If they have chosen to emit greenhouse gases, they should be held 
responsible for the consequences of their actions.  
 However, it might be objected that a single agent’s greenhouse gas emissions do not 
harm anyone. As Margaret Moore has suggested: 
 
[Even] if I drive a large SUV, which is far beyond what I need to get to work every 
day, the pollution generated, by itself, doesn’t cause global warming. The carbons 
emitted by me do not cause any harm, by themselves. The problem arises not 
because of my actions, but because millions of people like me, live a lifestyle that 
involves greenhouse gas emissions, and it is our uncoordinated individual 
action[s], which, together, cause harm to the environment (Moore 2008: 504). 
 
The harms of climate change are ‘accumulative harms’ (Feinberg 1984: 225). They are the 
consequence of the cumulative actions of many agents. One agent’s actions would not be 
enough.  
 The most common response to this problem is to suggest that we adopt a principle of 
proportionate responsibility: 
 
One might … reconstruct the [historic emitter pays principle ] to mean … that if 
actors X, Y, and Z perform actions which together cause pollution, then they should 
pay for the cost of the ensuing pollution in proportion to the amount of pollution that 
they have caused (Caney 2005: 753). 
 
Each agent should pay a share of the costs of climate change that is proportionate to their 
share of global emissions
iv
). This may seem intuitively plausible but it oversimplifies the 
situation. The proportionate responsibility claim is only the most plausible principle for 
dividing costs if the total harm is a ‘linear function of the total contribution’ (Kernohan 2000: 
349). However, the relationship between emissions and the harms of climate change is non-
linear in, at least, one important respect. There is a threshold of greenhouse gas 
concentrations below which climate change is not dangerous (i.e., does not cause any morally 
relevant harms). So, a graph of harm versus emissions will ‘start horizontally from the origin 
… [and] begin to rise at the [safe/dangerous] threshold’ (Kernohan 2000: 349).  
 If there is a safe global level of emissions, we might allocate those safe emissions 
fairly among agents. If all agents generate no more than their fair share of safe emissions, the 
safe global level will not be exceeded and there will be no harms of climate change. We 
might plausibly suggest that the responsibility for climate change should be attributed only to 
those agents who have emitted more than their fair share of emissions. The class of unfair 
polluters should pay the costs of climate change. If the relationship between emissions and 
harms above the safe threshold is linear, unfair polluters should pay the costs of climate 
change in proportion to their share of global unsafe emissions. We might call this the unfair 
historic emitter pays principle. 
 The distinction between the historic emitter pays principle and the unfair historic 
emitter pays principle is not always clearly articulated in the literature but many of the 
leading theorists (and policy advocates) subscribe to a version of the latter.
v
 This principle is 
attractive because it requires only that those who have acted unfairly pay the costs. We 
should note, however, that if we accept the unfair polluter pays principle as an account of 
who should pay the costs of climate change, we will need a prior account of the fair 
distribution of emission permits (or permissions to emit greenhouse gases). An account of the 
fair distribution of emission permits tells us what we are permitted to do without violating our 
duties to the potential victims of climate change. An account of who should pay the costs – 
such as the unfair historic emitter pays principle – tells us what unfair emitters should do to 
rectify the wrong that they have done in generating unfair emissions.  
 I will not address the problem of determining a fair allocation of permissions to emit 
greenhouse gasses in detail in this chapter. I have argued elsewhere that we should reject the 
claim that the obvious and only fair principle for allocating emission permits is ‘carbon 
egalitarianism’ – i.e., there is a universal human right to equal greenhouse gas emissions 
(Bell 2008).
vi
 Instead, an account of the fair allocation of permissions to emit greenhouse gas 
should be derived from an account of the relationship between greenhouse gas emitting 
activities and other more fundamental human interests (or rights) that should be protected. 
For example, if there is a human right to subsistence, all humans should be entitled to the 
quantity of greenhouse gas emission permits necessary for them to achieve subsistence. If this 
varies between different places and different times, we should not expect a fair allocation of 
emission permits to be an equal allocation.
vii
  
 In very general terms, the implications of the unfair historic emitter pays principle are 
relatively clear even without a detailed account of the fair allocation of greenhouse gas 
emissions. The developed states – and many of the individuals living in them – are very 
likely to have emitted more than their fair share during the last two hundred and fifty years. 
The developing states – and most of the individuals living in them – are very likely to have 
emitted less than their fair share of emissions during the same period. Therefore, the unfair 
historic emitter pays principle suggests that the developing states – as fair emitters – should 
not pay anything toward the costs of climate change and the developed states – as unfair 
emitters – should share the costs of climate change among themselves in proportion to each 
state’s share of the global total of unfair emissions. 
 The second principle that is constitutive of ‘common but differentiated 
responsibilities’ is the ability to pay principle. Shue suggests that the ability to pay principle 
is ‘widely accepted as a requirement of simple fairness’: Among a number of parties, all of 
whom are bound to contribute to some common endeavour, the parties who have the most 
resources normally should contribute the most to the endeavour (Shue 1999: 537). 
The ability to pay principle might require that only those above a threshold level of 
wealth should pay at all. In addition, the ability to pay principle might require a ‘progressive 
rate of payment: insofar as a party’s assets are greater, the rate at which the party should 
contribute to the enterprise in question also becomes greater’ (Shue 1999: 537). As Shue 
suggests: 
 
[The] progressivity [might] … be strictly proportional – those with double the base 
amount of assets contribute at twice the rate at which those with the base amount of 
assets contribute, those with triple the base amount of assets contribute at three 
times the rate at which those with the base amount of assets contribute, and so on 
(Shue 1999: 537). 
 
Alternatively, the progressivity might be less than strictly proportional (i.e. double assets 
implies less than double rate) or more than strictly proportional (i.e., double assets imply 
more than double rate). A threshold interpretation of the principle might be combined with a 
requirement that those above the threshold should pay a progressive rate contribution. 
 Shue suggests that the ability to pay principle is ‘sufficiently fundamental that it is not 
necessary, and perhaps not possible, to justify it by deriving it from considerations that are 
more fundamental still’ (Shue 1999: 537). However, he does point out that requiring flat 
contributions ‘focuses exclusively upon the contribution process and ignores the position in 
which, as a result of the process, the parties end up. Contribution according to ability to pay is 
much more sensitive both to concrete circumstances and to final outcome’ (Shue 1999: 537). 
Shue’s concerns about ‘concrete circumstances’ and ‘final outcome’ suggest that 
underlying the ability to pay principle is some version of an egalitarian theory of justice. We 
should require the better off to pay more toward the costs of tackling climate change because 
otherwise we will exacerbate existing inequalities. 
 If we require the better off to pay more, we reduce inequality and promote a more 
egalitarian distribution of resources. Some versions of the ability to pay principle will be 
consistent with a ‘weak egalitarianism’ or a (relatively) weak aversion to inequality (e.g., a 
relatively low threshold with gently progressive contributions above the threshold) while 
others will reflect a stronger aversion to inequality (e.g., a relatively high threshold with 
steeply progressive contributions above the threshold). In general, the ability to pay principle 
reflects the commitment of many contemporary liberals to equality of resources – or, at least, 
their commitment to oppose radical inequalities of resources. 
 The implications of the ability to pay principle in the case of climate change will 
depend upon which version of the principle we endorse. However, we can expect that the 
developed states, which are wealthier, would be required to pay more of the costs of climate 
change than the developing states, which are poorer. The relative contributions of the two 
groups – and each state (or even each individual person) – would depend on: the level of 
wealth threshold below which contributions were not required; and the progressive rates we 
apply above that threshold.  
 In this section, I have considered separately the two principles for allocating costs that 
are constitutive of the ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ principle. I have argued 
that we should re-formulate the historic emitter pays principle as the unfair historic emitter 
pays principle. This is grounded in the liberal principle that we should be held accountable 
for our choices, including our choice to emit greenhouse gasses. I have also argued that our 
interpretation of the ability to pay principle will depend on the strength of our aversion to 
inequality.  
 
Combining the two principles  
 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change suggests that we allocate 
responsibility for the costs of climate change on the basis of both ‘differentiated 
responsibility’ (unfair historic emitter pays principle) and ‘respective capabilities’ (ability to 
pay principle). In this section, I will critically consider three different ways that they might be 
combined. 
 Henry Shue has suggested that the unfair historic emitter pays principle and the ability 
to pay principle: 
 
Converge upon the same practical conclusion: whatever needs to be done by 
wealthy industrialized states or by poor non-industrialized states about global 
environmental problems like ozone destruction and global warming, the costs 
should initially be borne by the wealthy industrialized states (Shue 1999: 545). 
 
The unfair historic emitter pays principle and the ability to pay principle have the same 
practical implication, namely, the rich developed states should pay the initial costs of climate 
change. We might call this the convergence thesis: ‘common but differentiated 
responsibilities’ endorses two principles that have convergent implications. The convergence 
thesis is consistent with two different readings of the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change. On the first reading, the convention adopts an ‘overlapping consensus’ 
approach: if some people accept the unfair historic emitter pays principle and others accept 
the ability to pay principle, they can all accept the same conclusions. The two principles 
independently justify the same allocation of responsibilities, which anyone who accepts either 
principle can endorse.  
On the second reading, the UN convention adopts a ‘cumulative arguments’ approach: 
everyone should accept both the unfair historic emitter pays principle and the ability to pay 
principle and cumulatively these two principles offer a stronger justification than either one 
of them does independently for the conclusion that the developed states should pay the costs 
of climate change. I think we should reject the convergence thesis because the unfair historic 
emitter pays principle and the ability to pay principle only have convergent implications if we 
adopt a very simplified model of the world. Shue divides the world into two groups – 
developed and developing states. He uses the unfair historic emitter pays principle to 
distinguish between unfair historic emitters and fair historic emitters. He uses the ability to 
pay principle to distinguish between those with the ability to pay (i.e., above the threshold) 
and those who do not have the ability to pay (below the threshold). He claims that the class of 
unfair historic emitters and the class of those with the ability to pay can both be mapped 
directly onto the class of developed states. Therefore, the two principles converge on the 
claim that developed states should pay the costs of climate change.  
 I think we might plausibly treat this as a rough approximation that can guide more 
careful and detailed moral thinking about how we should allocate responsibility.. However, 
an international climate agreement will need to allocate costs among developed states, 
therefore, we must go beyond Shue’s simplified conception of the world and his simplified 
understanding of the implications of the unfair historic emitter pays principle and the ability 
to pay principle. It is very unlikely that any state’s responsibility under the unfair historic 
emitter pays principle (understood in terms of proportionate responsibility for unfair historic 
emissions) will be exactly the same as their responsibility under the ability to pay principle 
(whatever thresholds and contribution rates we endorse).
viii
 In short, the two principles do not 
converge on the same allocation of costs for those cases that are of most interest to us. 
 The unfair historic emitter pays principle and the ability to pay principle might be 
combined in a second way. Kate Raworth has proposed an ‘Adaptation Financing Index’, 
which ‘gives equal weight to a country’s responsibility and capability (50 per cent of the 
score each), and produces a broad indication of the share that each country should contribute 
to financing adaptation in developing countries’ (Raworth 2007: 25). Raworth’s combined 
principle might be applied to all of the costs of climate change (as opposed to only the costs 
of adaptation in developing countries). Her suggestion is that we should give equal weight to 
(versions of) the unfair historic emitter pays principle and the ability to pay principle in 
allocating the costs of climate change.  
For example, Raworth’s calculations suggest that the United States would be 
responsible for 51.4 percent of the costs of climate change under her version of the unfair 
historic emitter pays principle but only 36 percent of the costs of climate change under her 
version of the ability to pay principle. If the two principles are given equal weighting in 
determining the United States’ overall responsibility, it should pay 43.7 percent of the costs 
of climate change. Let us call a hybrid principle of this general type a weighted combination 
principle. 
 I think there are two important problems with Raworth’s weighted combination 
principle. First, the equal weighting of the unfair historic emitter pays principle and the 
ability to pay principle seems arbitrary. As Ed Page points out: ‘[The] authors provide no 
argument for their equal weighting of the two … elements. There is clearly some practical 
convenience associated with this assumption, but it does not reflect any sound philosophical 
analysis’ (Page 2008: 568). 
Raworth’s only defence of equal weighting lies in her commitment to ‘simplicity’: 
 
[The] value of an index lies in its ability to combine clear principles with relevant 
data in a systematic way, while ensuring that the complexity of the methodology is 
not greater than the quality of the data. We aim to make this index reflect the 
fundamental principles in as clear and simple a way as possible (Raworth 2007: 24-
5). 
 
Her claim is that we should avoid developing complex principles that require more 
sophisticated or more robust data (e.g. on emissions or wealth) than we have available. If the 
data is only indicative, the principles (and the index) can only provide a ‘broad indication’ of 
responsibility (Raworth 2007: 25). I think Raworth is right to draw attention to the difficulty 
of measuring unfair emissions and ability to pay. So, if there are good reasons for a weighted 
combination principle and there are no particularly strong reasons for something other than 
an equal weighting, we might accept Raworth’s proposal on grounds of simplicity.  
 However, there is a more serious problem with such a principle. As Caney has noted, 
the unfair historic emitter pays principle and the ability to pay principle ‘operate according to 
competing logics – one forward-looking and unconcerned with who created the problem and 
the other backward-looking in just those terms’ (Caney 2009b: 12). It seems odd to combine 
the two principles in this way to determine who should pay the costs of climate change.  
 We can see this more clearly if we consider how we generally think about 
responsibility for the consequences of unjust, unfair or harmful action. If one person, A, has 
harmed another person, B, we generally believe that A is responsible for the harm she has 
caused and for paying the associated costs. We wouldn’t also survey the wealth of everyone 
in the society to calculate each individual’s ability to pay the costs and then adopt a formula 
for sharing responsibility between A, who caused the harm, and those other members of 
society who are most able to pay the costs of rectifying or compensating for the harm.  
 The agent who has committed the injustice has the primary duty (or responsibility) to 
make good the situation of the victim of the injustice. We only require other people to 
contribute to making good the situation of the victim when the agent who has committed the 
injustice can’t (or won’t and can’t be made to) compensate the victim. In other words, we 
take the agent who has committed the injustice to be the primary duty-bearer and we take 
other people with the ability to pay to be secondary duty-bearers. Raworth’s weighted 
combination principle divides primary responsibility among the agents who have committed 
the injustice and those with the ability to pay, but this is not how we divide responsibility 
when we can identify agents who have committed an injustice. 
 This suggests a third way of combining the unfair historic emitter pays principle and 
the ability to pay principle. We might endorse the first as a principle for allocating primary 
duties for the costs of climate change and the second as a principle for allocating secondary 
duties. Let us call principles of this type two-stage, hybrid principles. At the first stage, we 
attribute responsibility for the costs of climate change to unfair historic emitters. At the 
second stage, we attribute responsibility for any costs that have not been paid by unfair 
historic emitters to those with the ability to pay. Caney has proposed a principle of this kind 
and has suggested four circumstances in which we might need to call on the secondary duty-
bearers.  
 First, some unfair historic emitters were excusably ignorant about the consequences of 
their actions. Caney offers this statement of the objection: 
 
What if someone did not know that performing a certain activity (such as burning 
fossil fuels) was harmful? And suppose, furthermore, that there was no way in 
which they could have known that it was harmful. In such a situation their 
ignorance is excusable and it seems extremely harsh to make them pay for 
something that they could not have anticipated (Caney 2005: 761). 
 
My actions might have caused harm but if I was excusably ignorant I should not have to pay 
the costs of solving the problem. As Caney points out, ‘it is widely accepted that many who 
have caused greenhouse gas emissions were unaware of the effects of their activities on the 
earth’s atmosphere’ (Caney 2005: 761). Therefore, they should not be required to pay the 
costs of climate change. 
 Second, some unfair historic emitters are no longer alive. As Caney points out, ‘much 
of the damage to the climate was caused by the policies of earlier generations: ‘It is, for 
example, widely recognized that there have been high levels of carbon dioxide emissions for 
the last two hundred years, dating back to the Industrial Revolution in Western Europe’ 
(Caney 2005: 756). Those who are dead cannot pay the costs associated with their unfair 
emissions. 
 Third, Caney suggests that the unfair historic emitter pays principle ‘may be unfair on 
the impoverished’ (Caney 2005: 763). Caney offers the following example: 
 
Consider, for example, a country that has in the recent past caused a great deal of 
pollution but that remains poor. … In this kind of situation the [unfair historic 
emitter pays] principle appears unfair, for it asks too much of the poor (Caney 
205: 763). 
 
This is unfair on the poor because it is too demanding. Therefore, poor unfair historic 
emitters should not be required to pay the costs of climate change. 
 Fourth, there may be some unfair historic emitters, who have been assigned primary 
responsibility for the costs of climate change, who simply ‘fail to comply with their duties’ 
(Caney 2005: 766). If we are ‘unable to make them comply’, we will have a situation in 
which they do not pay the costs associated with their unfair emissions (Caney 2005: 766). 
 Caney suggests that in all four cases the costs that are not paid by the primary duty-
bearers – i.e., the unfair historic emitters – should be paid by those with the ability to pay. In 
general, I think Caney’s strategy for combining the unfair historic emitter pays principle and 
the ability to pay principle is the right one – the unfair historic emitter pays principle must be 
the primary principle for allocating responsibility for the costs of climate change and the 
ability to pay principle must be a secondary or (as I will argue, in some cases) a tertiary 
principle for allocating the costs of climate change. However, I think there are some 
significant problems with the two-stage principle proposed by Caney. In the next section, I 
develop an alternative hybrid principle for allocating the costs of climate change through a 
critical discussion of Caney’s principle.  
  
 
Criticising Caney’s hybrid principle 
 
We might respond in three different ways to each of Caney’s four cases. First, we might 
accept his claim that the secondary duty-bearers (i.e., those with the ability to pay) should be 
held responsible for the costs associated with the specified subset of unfair historic emissions. 
Second, we might reject his argument and maintain that the primary duty-bearers (i.e., the 
unfair historic emitters) should be held responsible for the costs associated with their 
emissions. Third, we might accept his argument that the primary duty-bearers should not or 
cannot be held responsible for the costs associated with their unfair historic emissions but 
reject his claim that the costs should be borne by those with the ability to pay. Instead, we 
might propose an alternative principle for allocating the secondary duties associated with the 
specified subset of unfair historic emissions. This suggests that we might distinguish two 
parts of Caney’s argument in each of the four cases: the negative claim that unfair historic 
emitters should not or cannot pay; and the positive claim that the costs should be paid by 
those with the ability to pay.  
 We might usefully divide Caney’s four cases into two pairs. In two cases – the dead 
and the non-compliant – he suggests that some historic emitters cannot pay or are too 
powerful to be made to pay. In the other two cases – the excusably ignorant and the 
impoverished – he suggests that some historic emitters should not pay the costs of climate 
change. In the first two cases, we must accept Caney’s negative claim that dead and non-
compliant historic emitters cannot be made to pay the costs of climate change. We can only 
challenge his positive claim that the costs associated with their emissions should be paid by 
those with the ability to pay.  
 In the second two cases, there is a prima facie reason for requiring the unfair historic 
emitter to pay but Caney claims this is insufficient to justify requiring them to pay the costs 
of climate change. In these two cases, we might challenge either Caney’s negative claim or 
his positive claim. In other words, we might argue that the excusably ignorant and the 
impoverished should pay the costs of climate change associated with their unfair historic 
emissions (challenging the negative claim) or we might agree that the excusably ignorant and 
the impoverished shouldn’t pay but argue that the ability to pay principle is not the relevant 
principle for allocating secondary duties in these cases (challenging the positive claim). 
 We can begin by considering a challenge to the negative claim about the excusably 
ignorant. Shue suggests that ‘the kind of wrong involved in exceeding one’s fair share of 
allowable emissions has nothing to do with intention or foreseeability’ (Shue 1994: 363). The 
supply of emissions-absorbing capacity is fixed by the safe threshold and cannot be increased 
– it is ‘zero-sum’ (Shue 1994: 364). Therefore, ‘anyone’s excess encroaches upon someone 
else’s share’ – it deprives them of something to which they are entitled and (probably) 
‘something they badly need’ (Shue 1994: 364; original emphasis).ix It is important to note 
that the victim of this kind of injustice is someone deprived of their fair share of emission 
permits; not someone harmed by the effects of climate change.
x
 Shue’s claim is that by taking 
more than my fair share I have committed an injustice whether or not I knew what I was 
doing. I may not be morally culpable for my actions – and I may not deserve either blame or 
punishment – but I still have a duty to rectify the injustice that I have committed (Shue 1999: 
535-6). 
 Shue’s challenge is unconvincing for two reasons. First, it concentrates on the 
situation of the person who doesn’t get their fair share of emission permits. Shue is surely 
right that they should be compensated because they have not received what they were entitled 
to receive. However, he has not justified the claim that they must be compensated by 
excusably ignorant unfair historic emitters. Their compensation need not come in the form of 
a greater share of emission permits but might come in the form of other goods or resources 
that make an equivalent contribution to their fundamental interests or well-being. Therefore, 
it need not be provided by unfair historic emitters or in proportion to unfair historic 
emissions. Moreover, he has not shown that excusably ignorant unfair historic emitters 
should be held responsible for the costs of climate change – or even that they have committed 
an injustice against the victims of climate change.  
 Second, we saw earlier that underlying the unfair historic emitter pays principle was 
the liberal principle that individuals should be held accountable for their choices. However, 
an agent cannot make an informed choice if they are unaware of the consequences of their 
actions. Shue’s challenge suggests that this is irrelevant but it seems excessively demanding 
to expect agents to bear full responsibility for the costs of harms or injustices that they cause 
unintentionally and unknowingly in an uncertain world.
xi
 Excusably ignorant emitters may 
have acted unfairly but they have not acted unjustly because they did not act freely and 
should not be held responsible for their actions (Beckerman and Pasek 1995: 410). In 
summary, I have argued that we should accept Caney’s negative claim that the excusably 
ignorant should not be held responsible for the costs associated with their unfair emissions. 
 I think Caney’s negative argument that the impoverished should not have to pay the 
costs associated with their unfair historic emissions is more problematic. Caney imagines ‘a 
country that has in the recent past caused a great deal of pollution but that remains poor’ 
(Caney 2005: 761). In this case, he suggests that the unfair historic emitter pays principle 
‘asks too much of the poor’ (Caney 2005: 763). There are two problems with this argument.  
 First, it does not distinguish between an agent who is responsible for their own 
poverty (e.g., because they have gambled away their wealth or because they have engaged in 
non-productive emissions generating activities) and an agent who is not responsible for their 
own poverty (e.g., because of injustices committed against them or because of the effects of a 
natural disaster). If the unfair historic emitter pays principle is grounded in the liberal 
principle that we should be held accountable for our choices, unfair historic emitters who are 
responsible for their own poverty should be required to pay the costs of climate change 
associated with their unfair emissions. 
 Caney might suggest that there are some rights – e.g., the right to subsistence – which 
are inviolable and which even those who act unjustly cannot forfeit. I agree but I think this 
shows only that there may be some circumstances in which we have to wait for extremely 
poor unfair emitters to fulfil their duty to compensate the victims of climate change. In such 
circumstances, they have a duty to do whatever they legitimately can to improve their 
situation so that they can pay the costs associated with their unfair emissions. Of course, in 
the short term others may have a duty to (temporarily) cover the unpaid costs.  
 Second, Caney’s argument does not show that unfair historic emitters who are not 
responsible for their own poverty should be exempt from the costs associated with their 
unfair historic emissions. Instead, they may be owed compensation for the injustices that they 
have suffered (or help to overcome a natural disaster) before they should be required to pay 
the costs associated with their unfair emissions. In other words, their duty does not disappear 
but rather is placed in abeyance until they are in a position to fulfil it. Again, others may need 
to act in the short term to temporarily cover the unpaid costs.  
 I have suggested that three of Caney’s negative claims – regarding the dead, the non-
compliant and the excusably ignorant – are convincing. However, I have suggested that poor 
unfair historic emitters – and, in particular, those responsible for their own poverty – should 
pay the costs of climate change (at least, in the longer term). 
 Caney’s positive claim is that those with the ability to pay should pay when historic 
unfair emitters cannot be made to pay or should not pay. Is there an alternative principle to 
the ability to pay principle that we might use to allocate secondary duties? 
 The beneficiary pays principle suggests that the beneficiaries of emissions-generating 
activities should pay the costs of climate change: 
 
[The] current developed countries readily accept the benefits from past emissions 
in the form of their high standard of living and should therefore not be exempted 
from being held accountable for the detrimental side-effects with which their living 
standards were achieved (Neumayer 2000: 189). 
 
If we accept the benefits of greenhouse gas-emitting activities, we should also accept the 
associated costs. There are two ways of interpreting the beneficiary pays principle.  
 On the first account, the beneficiary pays principle expresses the idea that free-riding 
is wrong. Gauthier defines a free-rider as someone who ‘obtains a benefit without paying all 
or part of its cost’ (1986: 96). The beneficiary of greenhouse gas emitting activities obtains 
the benefit without paying the externality costs of those activities. Someone else is left to pay 
the costs. This account depends on an ‘action-specific redistributive approach’: 
 
The logic is akin to the rejection of arbitrariness present in egalitarian theories, but 
the scope is more restricted since it deals with benefits and harms that are causally 
related. They are derived from a single (set of) action(s) (Gosseries 2004: 50; 
original emphasis). 
 
Benefiting from greenhouse gas emitting activities without paying the costs of climate change 
is wrong (or unjust) because it produces an inegalitarian distribution of the benefits and 
burdens. Benefits and burdens that are the consequence of the same set of actions should be 
shared equally among all of those affected by that set of actions. 
 This interpretation of the beneficiary pays principle is unconvincing because it is not 
at all clear why we should be action-specific egalitarians. Liberals are generally concerned 
about the unequal distribution of benefits and burdens because they believe that ‘all 
disadvantages resulting from circumstances (natural events or involuntary human actions) 
that were imposed should be compensated’ (Gosseries 2004: 49). In other words, they believe 
that agents should not be held responsible for their brute bad luck and that agents are not 
entitled to the benefits of their brute good luck (Dworkin 1981: 293). If our aim is to 
neutralise the effects of brute luck, we should adopt general egalitarian principles. We should 
not focus on the distribution of the benefits and burdens resulting from particular actions (or 
sets of actions). Instead, we should focus on the overall distribution of benefits and burdens.  
 Therefore, liberal egalitarians should not endorse this interpretation of the beneficiary 
pays principle. If they have to choose between action-specific redistribution (i.e., egalitarian 
redistribution of the benefits and burdens deriving from greenhouse gas emitting activities) 
and general redistribution (i.e., egalitarian redistribution of all benefits and burdens), they 
should choose general redistribution. They should endorse the ability to pay principle, which 
requires those with the most benefits overall (i.e., the wealthiest) to pay the costs of climate 
change, rather than the beneficiary pays principle. 
 There is a second interpretation of the beneficiary pays principle that offers a different 
account of why beneficiaries should pay the costs of climate change. On this interpretation, 
beneficiaries should pay the costs of climate change because they have benefited from unjust 
– or rights-violating – actions. Unfair historic emitters have committed an injustice by 
emitting more than their fair share of emissions because their actions violate the rights of 
potential victims of climate change. We have no entitlement to wealth that has been acquired 
through unjust – or rights-violating – actions. Therefore, we have no entitlement to wealth 
that was created by someone emitting more than their fair share of emissions. This 
interpretation of the beneficiary pays principle is more attractive than the previous 
interpretation for two reasons. 
 First, it does not rely on action-specific egalitarianism. The claim is not that we must 
distribute the benefits and burdens derived from greenhouse gas emitting activities equally, 
but rather that the beneficiaries of emitting activities are not entitled to those benefits because 
they were produced unjustly. Second, this interpretation of the beneficiary pays principle is 
based on commonly accepted principles of just acquisition and transfer. If a benefit (or good) 
that has been acquired unjustly is voluntarily transferred to me by its current possessor, I am 
not entitled to it. 
 For example, if one person, A, steals a car from another person, B, and gives it to a 
third person, C, who is entirely innocent, C is not entitled to the car because A did not justly 
acquire the car and was not entitled to transfer ownership to C. Similarly, if one agent, A, 
acquires wealth (or, for example, the ‘benefits of industrialisation’) by emitting more than 
their fair share of emissions, A has ‘stolen’ from other agents who are unable to emit their 
fair share of emissions and has contributed to the violation of the rights of victims of climate 
change. Therefore, A did not justly acquire his wealth and is not entitled to transfer 
ownership of it or share it with other agents. 
 The ‘unjust acquisition and transfer’ interpretation of the beneficiary pays principle 
suggests that those who benefit from unjust emissions generating activities are not entitled to 
their unjustly acquired wealth. Therefore, we might legitimately require the beneficiaries of 
dead and non-compliant emitters to pay the costs of climate change associated with the 
original unjust emissions. The beneficiaries can be held liable – as secondary duty-bearers – 
for costs that the original wrongdoer (who has primary responsibility under the unfair historic 
emitter pays principle) can’t pay or can’t be made to pay.xii  
 The same cannot be said about the beneficiaries of excusably ignorant emitters. If we 
believe that the excusably ignorant unfair emitter did not act unjustly (because his action was 
not sufficiently informed to be considered a free action), his wealth is justly acquired and he 
is entitled to transfer or share it. His beneficiaries should not be held liable for the costs of 
climate change because he was not liable for those costs.  
 Therefore, I would suggest that Caney is right to endorse the ability to pay principle 
as the most appropriate principle for allocating the costs of climate change associated with 
the unfair emissions of the excusably ignorant. However, he is wrong to suggest that this 
principle should be an all-purpose secondary principle for allocating the costs of climate 
change. The costs of climate change associated with the unfair emissions of the dead and 
non-compliant (assuming that they were not also excusably ignorant) should be paid by the 
beneficiaries of their unjust actions. Of course, if (some of) the beneficiaries of unjust 
emissions are themselves dead or non-compliant, we may need to resort to the ability to pay 
principle as a tertiary principle for the allocation of the costs of climate change. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Climate change should be approached as an issue of justice. The United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change does adopt this approach and suggests an account both of 
human rights and duties. In this chapter, I have focussed on the principle proposed in the 
convention for allocating duties to pay the costs of climate change – namely, the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities and I have located my discussion in the recent 
literature in political philosophy on climate duties. I have proposed the following hybrid 
principle: 
The unfair historic emitter pays principle: unfair historic emitters should pay the costs of 
climate change in proportion to their share of global unsafe emissions;  
The excusable ignorance exception: excusably ignorant unfair historic emitters did not act 
unjustly because they were not responsible for their actions, therefore, they should not be 
held liable for the costs of climate change; 
The ‘unjust acquisition and transfer’ interpretation of the beneficiary pays principle: 
the beneficiaries of dead and non-compliant unjust emitters should be held liable – as 
secondary duty-bearers – for the costs of climate change associated with the original unjust 
emissions; 
The ability to pay principle: those with the ability to pay should pay any residual costs of 
climate change (specifically, the costs associated with the unfair emissions of the excusably 
ignorant and the costs associated with unjust emissions where some or all of the beneficiaries 
of dead and non-compliant emitters are themselves dead or non-compliant). 
 I want to conclude with two comments on this hybrid principle. First, we should note 
that it is incompletely specified in several important respects. I have not offered an account of 
the fair distribution of emission rights, which is necessary for us to be able to determine when 
historic emissions have been unfair. I have not considered how we should determine when an 
agent can genuinely claim to have been excusably ignorant of the consequences of their 
emitting activities – and, therefore, not liable for the costs of climate change. I have not 
considered how the costs of climate change that fall to unjust beneficiaries of emitting 
activities should be shared among them. I have not offered an account of how the costs of 
climate change that fall to those with the ability to pay should be shared among them (e.g., 
should rates be steeply progressive?). In short, there is much more work to be done to 
develop a full theory of climate duties. 
 Second, it might be suggested that the proposed principle is impractical because it is 
too difficult to operationalize. How do we accurately determine (unfair) historic emissions? 
How do we determine whether emitters were excusably ignorant? How do we determine who 
benefited – and how much – from unjust emissions? This is an important challenge but I 
think we can offer two responses.  
 First, the proposed principle has some relatively clear implications. In particular, it 
rules out a number of proposals that have received attention in international politics. For 
example, it suggests that the developed nations cannot be held responsible for historic 
emissions in any period where they can reasonably claim excusable ignorance of the 
consequences of their greenhouse gas emitting activities. This should rule out some proposals 
for allocating the costs of climate change, including, for example, the Brazilian Proposal, 
which attributes responsibility based on emissions since 1840 (Brazilian Party at UNFCCC, 
1997). 
 Similarly, it is likely to rule out any international agreement that requires the poor in 
developing nations to pay any of the costs of climate change in the near future. They have not 
emitted more than their fair share of historic emissions. They have not benefited from the 
unjust emissions of others. They are relatively less able to pay the costs of climate change. In 
sum, they are unlikely to be required to pay the costs of climate change by the unfair historic 
emitter pays principle, the beneficiary pays principle or the ability to pay principle, which 
collectively constitute the proposed hybrid principle. So, the developed nations will be 
required to pay the costs of climate change for some time to come.  
 Moreover, the proposed principle suggests that the largest share of the costs of climate 
change should be paid by those with high historic emissions in the relatively recent past (i.e., 
post-excusable ignorance) while any shortfall (due to death or non-compliance) should be 
paid by those who have benefited most from unjust emissions and, finally, by those who are 
wealthiest. This is likely to imply an allocation of responsibilities among developed nations 
that is quite different from the relatively undifferentiated approach adopted in the Kyoto 
Protocol, which reflected political compromise more than judgements of justice. 
 We might also offer a second response. The problems of operationalizing the 
proposed principle may be exaggerated. We would need to agree how we should 
approximately measure the key determinants of our climate duties. We expect this to be 
difficult. However, I think this expectation is grounded in a realist understanding of 
international relations. In other words, we expect it to be difficult to operationalize mainly 
because we expect different agents to seek to promote an operationalization that is in their 
own interests.  
 If we believe that the proposed principle is the correct principle of climate justice, we 
should not abandon it just because some self-interested agents oppose it or are likely to argue 
about how it should be operationalized. Instead, we should seek to develop and defend 
plausible ways of operationalizing the proposed principle in research projects that encourage 
normative political philosophers to work with social and natural scientists. 
 
                                                 
i
 See IPCC (2007: 33). 
ii
 Caney uses the term ‘hybrid’ to label his own principle (2005: 769). I use the term more generally to refer to 
principles that are pluralistic (i.e., combine more than one pure principle). 
iii
 There are interesting discussions of rights and climate change in Caney (2006a), Caney (2008), Caney 
(2009c), Hayward (2007), Vanderheiden (2008: 240-42) and Bell (2004). See also Hayward (2005) for a more 
general discussion of environmental rights. 
iv
 As Page notes, equal weight for all historic emissions is only one of ‘various ways of assessing the impact of 
[an agent’s] cumulative emissions on the climate system’ (Page 2008: 558).  
v
 See, for example, Caney (2005: 765), Shue (1994: 362-4) and Raworth (2007: 24).  
vi
 See also Hayward (2007: 439-44) and Beckerman and Pasek (1995: 409). 
vii
 A very similar argument is made by Hayward (2007: 441). 
viii
 This is clear in Raworth’s attempt to operationalize versions of the two principles, which I discuss below 
(Raworth 2007: 28). For example, on Raworth’s account, the USA is responsible for 51.4 percent of the costs of 
climate change under one principle but only 36 percent under the other.  
ix
 Gardiner and Neumayer make similar arguments (Gardiner 2004: 581; Neumayer 2000: 188). 
x
 It is interesting that Shue focuses on the injustice to other emitters rather than victims of climate change in this 
context. Gardiner rejects excusable ignorance as an excuse in relation to the costs of preventing or compensating 
for the harms of climate change (Gardiner 2004: 581). However, his argument is very brief and does not offer a 
clear justification for holding the excusably ignorant responsible for the costs of climate change. 
xi
 Caney makes a related argument from ‘demandingness’ (Caney 2005: 762). 
xii
 Caney considers this view and argues that it is ‘problematic, in part, because it is sometimes difficult to 
identify the relevant duty-bearers’ (Caney 2006b, 477). I address this objection (albeit briefly) in the final 
section of this paper when I consider whether we can operationalize my proposed principle. 
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